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Abstract  
 
Historically, marginalized groups such as racial minorities, members of the LGBTQ+ 
community, and women have sought to obtain policy gains by increasing their descriptive 
representation through the election of officials with similar demographic qualities. Yet, this 
increased representation may also threaten dominant groups and result in negative responses 
such as a legislative backlash, wherein opposition legislators introduce proposals 
counterproductive to the marginalized group’s progress. While this ”offensive” legislative 
backlash oftentimes occurs in response to the increased presence of Black and queer legislators, 
scholarship suggests such a backlash towards female legislators may adopt a more “defensive” 
form, wherein opponents block bills beneficial to women rather than propose bills 
counterproductive to their interests.  
 
This study analyzes women’s issue bills in six state legislatures to explore whether women’s 
increased descriptive representation results in a legislative backlash and, if so, how such a 
backlash may occur. Increased female representation was hypothesized to result in a legislative 
backlash counterproductive to women’s interests.  This backlash was hypothesized to primarily 
occur in a defensive form. Results suggest that increased female representation triggers a slight 
offensive backlash as well as a partisan form of a defensive backlash specific to legislative 
sessions where the Democratic Party has a majority. 
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Introduction  
 
Since the 1970s, the number of women serving in state legislatures has nearly quintupled 
from 344 women in 1971 to 1805 women as of 2016 (Center for American Women and Politics, 
2016). This marked increase in the number of female legislators across the United States reflects 
not only a notable political, but cultural shift in traditional stereotypes surrounding gender and 
power that can carry deep implications for women’s progress, or the reduction of barriers to 
women’s equality (Cudd, 2012). While rising numbers of women in state legislatures may 
indicate important political gains for women, if men perceive these gains as losses and feel that 
traditional masculine power dynamics are being threatened, increased female representation may 
also translate into unintended negative backlash responses from men that ultimately to hinder 
women’s overall political advancement. As political scientist Grace Hall Saltzstein notes, “the 
answer to the question as to what difference it makes if women are elected to office not only 
must address what those women do in office, but also must address what others do in response or 
reaction to their presence” (qtd. Reingold 2008). Thus, although increased female representation 
in state legislatures may result in policies beneficial to women’s progress, such policies will lose 
their inherent value if every new policy that advances women’s interests is followed by a 
reactive action from men that undermines these same interests.  
Within the literature, empirical studies have found that the increased presence of Black 
representatives in state legislatures has resulted in an increase in legislation counterproductive to 
the Black community, and the increased presence of queer legislators has resulted in an increase 
in legislation counterproductive to the LGBTQ+ community (Haider-Markel, 2010; Haider-
Markel, 2007; Bratton, 2002). While past research suggests that an increase in female legislators 
might result in a similar legislative backlash contrary to women’s interests, previous work has 
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failed to find empirical evidence of a legislative backlash against women’s increased descriptive 
representation (Reingold, 2008; Haider-Markel, 2007; Kathlene, 1994; Maybee, 2008).  My 
research seeks to fill that gap in the literature through a two-phase research project that explores 
whether women’s increased representation in state legislatures results in a legislative backlash 
that increases policy actions counterproductive to women’s interests. By advancing research 
about potential legislative backlash responses to women’s increased representation, I hope that 
political scientists and organizers alike will be able to better understand how historically 
underrepresented groups can best make policy gains while minimizing the risk of policy losses 
from a potentially hostile ruling majority.    
In this paper, I will first review the literature that currently exists surrounding backlash 
responses to the increased representation of traditionally marginalized groups and how such 
literature relates to women. Next, I will present my hypotheses about the existence of a 
legislative backlash in response to women’s increased representation in state government. I will 
then explain the case selection process that went into choosing the six state legislative sessions I 
chose to analyze. Following this discussion of case selection, I will describe the data that I used 
to test my hypotheses as well as how such data was obtained before explaining my research 
design, which can be divided into two phases. The first phase of my research examines 
manifestations of a backlash that can be classified as “offensive responses,” wherein opponents 
actively propose bills harmful to women’s rights. The second phase examines manifestations of 
legislative backlash that can be classified as “defensive responses,” wherein opponents adopt an 
obstructive approach to women’s rights by blocking bills that are beneficial to women. Finally, 
from the results of my research design, I will assess the accuracy of my hypotheses, draw 
conclusions, and identify areas of future study. 
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Literature Review  
Descriptive and Substantive Representation  
Historically, activists within traditionally marginalized groups such as racial minorities, 
members of LGBTQ+ community, and women have sought to advance their political interests 
through descriptive representation, or the election of officials who possess similar demographic 
identities with a given constituent group (Haider-Markel, 2010; Preuhs, 2007; Bratton, 2002). By 
electing officials with shared backgrounds and experiences, members of underrepresented 
communities can gain multiple benefits. Increased descriptive representation may provide 
marginalized groups with role models who inspire higher levels of group political engagement, 
or foster higher levels of group confidence towards legislative bodies that have previously lacked 
the diversity necessary to understand a given group’s best political interests (Dovi, 2008).   
However, the advantage most commonly attributed to increased descriptive 
representation is its resulting translation into substantive representation, or the favorable 
representation of a given group’s policy interests (Haider-Markel, 2007; Preuhs, 2007; Bratton, 
2002). Although marginalized groups may also obtain policy gains with the help of sympathetic 
elected allies, descriptive representation has generally been viewed as the most reliable way to 
produce substantive representation (Haider-Markel, 2007). Through descriptive representation, 
underrepresented groups can compensate for institutional inequalities and combat traditional 
barriers to political recognition through the presence of a government representative who shares 
similar demographic or cultural characteristics (Dovi, 2008).   
Within the context of racial politics, empirical studies have found that when Black 
politicians are elected to office, increased Black representation leads to increased policy benefits 
to the Black community (Haider-Markel, 2010; Haider-Markel, 2007; Bratton & Haynie, 1999). 
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Additional studies exploring the effects of Latino descriptive representation have found similar 
evidence that increased Latino descriptive representation creates comparable policy benefits for 
Latinos (Haider-Markel, 2010; Haider-Markel, 2007; Preuhs, 2007; Thomas, 1994).  However, 
racial minorities are not the only historically marginalized groups who appear to benefit from 
electing officials who share in their distinctive identities. Research surrounding the influence of 
openly queer legislators has also found that as more LGBTQ+ candidates are elected to 
legislatures, the number of pro-LGBTQ+ bills that are introduced and adopted both increase 
(Haider-Markel, 2010; Haider-Markel, 2007).   
Within this context, studies on women’s descriptive representation suggest that a greater 
female legislative presence produces a greater quantity and variety of policy proposals related to 
women (Haider-Markel, 2010; Haider-Markel, 2007; Bratton, 2002). Overall, research has found 
that female legislators are more likely than male legislators to serve on committees relevant to 
women’s issues, as well as draft, introduce, and advocate for legislation that addresses women’s 
concerns (Bratton & Haynie, 1999; Cammisa & Reingold, 2004). Furthermore, studies have 
shown that male and female legislators differ in their policy priorities, the interests they 
represent, and their conceptualization of issues, with these descriptive differences carrying 
significant policy implications (Rosenthal, 1997). Such trends suggest that, compared to male 
representatives, female representatives better articulate women’s priorities and perspectives 
through policies that more carefully take into account their effects on female constituents (Dovi, 
2008).   
Backlash Theory  
Yet, despite the distinct benefits that increased descriptive representation can offer 
historically underrepresented groups, one must also consider the unintended consequences that 
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may result from these groups’ resulting political progress. The full impact of legislative diversity 
depends not only on how it affects members of traditionally marginalized groups who identify as 
non-White, queer, or female, but also its effect on members of traditionally dominant groups 
who identify as White, heterosexual, or male (Bratton, 2002). In any given society, there is 
always a status quo, which provides certain individuals with a greater capacity than others to 
enact their preferences or recognize their interests (Mansbridge & Shames, 2008). Thus, 
whenever groups disadvantaged by the status quo seek to reshape social structures in order to 
make political gains, it challenges the status quo and threatens the dominant groups’ institutional 
privileges (Mansbridge & Shames, 2008; Cudd, 2002).   
As a result, dominant groups who feel a declining sense of importance may resist shifts in 
the status quo by using coercive power in an attempt to restore their perceived loss of control, 
and reverse progress made by previously disadvantaged groups (Bishin et. al, 2015; Post & 
Siegel, 2007; Cudd, 2002). Political scientists define this negative response to the social, 
economic, or political gains of traditionally marginalized groups as a backlash (Haider-Markel, 
2010; Haider-Markel, 2007). The theory behind backlash politics was first developed during the 
Civil Rights Movement, when the term was used in reference to both the South’s violent 
resistance to Black progress, as evidenced by increased Ku Klux Klan membership among 
Southern Whites, as well as the “White ‘backlash’ in the North,” as evidenced by White 
supremacist George Wallace’s high polling numbers among Northern Whites during the 1964 
presidential primaries (Post & Siegel, 2007).   
In many cases, a political backlash may result in traditionally marginalized groups 
regressing, rather than progressing from the place of inequality where they initially started under 
the status quo. Theories surrounding political backlash vary in both the roles that they ascribe 
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different actors within a given society, such as masses versus elites, as well as the many ways 
that a political backlash can manifest itself, such as negative public opinion or political 
movements in the form of countermobilization (Bishin et. al, 2015; Price & Keck, 2015; 
Mansbridge & Shames, 2008; Post & Siegel, 2007). Generally, the literature has focused on 
backlash in relation to the court system, and purports that the majority of political backlashes are 
provoked by major judicial decisions that outpace public opinion on issues of social reform 
(Price & Keck, 2015; Keck, 2009; Post & Siegel, 2007). Legal scholars most commonly cite the 
Supreme Court as a major instigator of such backlashes, arguing that the Court’s decision to 
desegregate schools in Brown v. Board exacerbated the era’s Southern segregationist policies, 
and that its later decision to legalize abortion in Roe v. Wade inspired the “right-to-life” 
movement that led many legislators to enact policies restricting women’s access to 
contraceptives and abortions (Price & Keck, 2015; Keck, 2009; Post & Siegel, 2007).   
These legal scholars attribute the backlash resulting from these court cases to not only 
shifts in the status quo that derived from court rulings, but also concerns about the institutional 
mechanisms through which these changes were enacted. A common argument within this 
literature is that if Civil Rights and Women’s Rights activists had sought progress through more 
politically responsive institutions such as legislatures, then their policy victories would have 
been better insulated from opposition (Price & Keck, 2009; Post & Siegel, 2007). In theory, 
whereas courts respond to “agendas set by litigants” and make decisions in a way that may be 
seen as “anti-majoritarian,” legislatures govern through a process of democratic negotiation that 
operates under a majority rule (Price & Keck, 2015; Post & Siegel, 2007). According to this 
logic, legislatures thus function in ways that are less likely to provoke large political backlashes, 
and allow historically underrepresented groups to make policy gains in ways that the general 
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public is likely to perceive as “more legitimate” (Price & Keck, 2009; Post & Siegel, 2007). As a 
result, such arguments have been used to support claims that the best way for traditionally 
marginalized groups to achieve substantive representation is through descriptive representation 
in legislative bodies.   
Yet, contemporary scholarship has challenged the notion that progress produced by 
legislatures are better equipped than the courts to protect traditionally marginalized groups from 
political backlash. A number of studies have found little evidence to support claims that 
legislative policies are more acceptable to opponents than judicially enacted ones, 
and further scholarship suggests that any actor or action that saliently challenges the status quo 
may cause backlash, including legislatures (Bishin et. al, 2015; Haider-Markel, 2010; Price & 
Keck, 2015; Keck, 2009). Furthermore, political scientists have also extended the definition of 
“challenges to the status quo” to include the election of members of traditionally marginalized 
groups, suggesting that the increased descriptive representation of historically underrepresented 
groups may also lead to an unforeseen political backlash (Bishin et. al, 2015; Bishin & Smith, 
2013; Haider-Markel, 2010; Sanbonmatsu, 2008; Haider-Markel, 2007; Preuhs, 2007; Bratton 
& Reingold, 2004; Kathlene, 2004; Bratton, 2002; Yoder, 1994).   
Sanbonmatsu (2008) notes that negative reactions to a traditionally marginalized group’s 
increased descriptive representation can vary based on the magnitude of perceived changes to the 
status quo, such as the number of traditionally marginalized legislators who are elected, the rate 
at which they are elected, and the type of offices that such legislators win. Within Sanbonmatsu’s 
framework, resulting backlash reactions to increased representation among traditionally 
marginalized groups can manifest itself in three forms: (a) lower electoral success among 
otherwise qualified politicians associated with the marginalized group, (b) less tolerance directed 
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towards individual members of the group (rather than the identifying politicians themselves), 
and/or (c) legislative opposition to the group overall through policy actions (Sanbonmatsu 2008). 
Of the three potential negative responses to increased descriptive representation, political 
scientists have most closely examined the third response, or a legislative backlash.   
Under a legislative backlash, the perceived policy gains acquired by traditionally 
marginalized groups may lead traditionally dominant legislators to introduce and pass legislation 
counterproductive to the marginalized group’s progress (Haider-Markel, 2010; Haider-Markel, 
2007; Bratton, 2002). In some cases, empirical data has supported claims that an increase in 
legislators from historically underrepresented groups results in such legislative backlashes. 
Bratton’s (2002) analysis of state legislative bills revealed a correlation between an increase in 
Black descriptive representation and an increase in legislation counterproductive to the interests 
of the Black community. Furthermore, Haider-Markel (2007) found that while the presence of 
openly queer state legislators increased the likelihood of pro-LGBTQ+ legislation being 
introduced and passed, it also significantly increased the likelihood of anti-LGBTQ+ legislation 
being introduced and passed.   
Backlash Theory Surrounding Women  
Past research, political theory, and historical precedent suggest that an increase in female 
state legislators will also result in a legislative backlash contrary to women's interests. 
Throughout American history, there has always been a gender hierarchy within American 
politics, wherein men have dominated the norms, procedures, and goals of legislatures 
(Reingold, 2008; Ritter, 2008). According to scholars, such political premises have ultimately 
infused legislative bodies with masculine expectations, thus constructing legislatures as 
"gendered institutions" that inherently favor male legislators in their "processes, practices, 
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images and ideologies, and distributions of power" (Wolbrecht, 2008; Rosenthal, 1997). Thus, 
the introduction of female legislators into these traditionally masculine bodies may lead some 
male legislators to believe that increased female representation is a threat to their dominant 
positions of power in the political status quo, causing them to act with hostility towards their 
female colleagues (Haider-Markel, 2010; Reingold, 2008; Thomas, 1994). 
  Earlier studies have found that female representatives oftentimes experience patterns of 
social isolation from their male counterparts in legislatures, and that as the proportion of female 
representatives participating in legislative committees increases, male representatives become 
more verbally aggressive and conversationally dominant during proceedings (Reingold, 2008; 
Haider-Markel, 2007; Kathlene, 1994). Some scholars have interpreted these actions as evidence 
that the increased presence of female representatives results in a behavioral backlash from male 
representatives who feel threatened (Maybee, 2008; Reingold, 2008; Haider-Markel, 2007; 
Kathlene, 1994). As a result, one may infer that such attempts by male legislators to preserve 
historically masculine power and control over legislatures may also translate into a legislative 
backlash. However, such a hypothesis has yet to be adequately supported. Although Bratton 
(2002) found evidence suggesting that an increase in the number of female legislators is 
associated a legislative backlash against women, Bratton and Ray’s (2002) similar analysis of 
female legislators in Norway failed to find evidence that increased female representation leads to 
a legislative backlash.  
Thus, although the existing body of empirical research surrounding legislative backlashes 
in general requires significant expansion (Haider-Markel, 2010; Haider-Markel, 2007; Bratton, 
2002; Bratton & Ray, 2002), scholarship regarding the existence of a legislative backlash in 
response to women’s increased descriptive representation specifically remains ambiguous and 
14 
 
limited. While past research implies that an increase in female legislators could result in a similar 
legislative backlash contrary to women’s interests, previous work has failed to find empirical 
evidence of a legislative backlash against women’s increased descriptive representation 
(Reingold, 2008; Haider-Markel, 2007; Kathlene, 1994; Maybee, 2008).  My research will fill 
that gap in the literature by exploring not only whether an increase in women’s descriptive 
representation results in a legislative backlash, but, if so, how it manifests itself.  By advancing 
research in this area, political scientists and organizers alike will be able to better understand the 
dynamics of descriptive representation, and how historically underrepresented groups can best 
make policy gains while minimizing the risk of policy losses from a potentially hostile ruling 
majority.   
Research Design 
Hypotheses 
My research analyzes all women’s issue bills from state six state House sessions during a 
ten-year period from 1999 to 2009. I accomplish this task through a two-phase analysis that 
explores whether women’s increased descriptive representation results in a legislative backlash 
and, if so, how such a backlash may occur. For the first phase of my research, I analyze whether 
an increase in women’s descriptive representation in state legislatures will lead to the “offensive” 
form of legislative backlash that has been attributed to the increased presence of Black and queer 
legislators, wherein opponents actively propose bills harmful to women’s rights. For this phase 
of my research, I predict that: (a) an increase in pro-women’s legislation and (b) an increase in 
anti-women’s legislation. If my hypotheses are correct, such findings will both support previous 
claims about a positive relationship between descriptive representation and substantive 
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representation and claims about the existence of an offensive legislative backlash towards 
women’s increased presence in state bodies.   
Past scholarship also implies that the legislative backlash towards female legislators takes 
on a “defensive” approach, with opponents blocking bills beneficial to women (Ghelen, 1977; 
Volden et. al, 2010; Wittmer & Bouché, 2013). Therefore, in the second phase of my study, I 
focus more closely on bills identified in the first phase of my research as “pro-women,” and use 
the gender composition of each bill’s sponsorship as a metric for female descriptive 
representation to examine if a more subtle form of backlash impacts the legislative trajectory of 
pro-women’s bills. For this second phase, I predict that as the proportion of female sponsorship 
on pro-women’s bills increases, such bills would be less likely to: (a) receive action in state 
House committees or on state House floors, (b) pass state Houses, (c) receive action in state 
Senate committees or on state Senate floors, (d) pass state Senates, or (e) be signed into law by a 
given state’s governor. If these hypotheses are correct, such findings will also support claims 
about the existence of a defensive legislative backlash in response to women’s increased 
presence in state bodies.  
Phase One: Offensive Backlash Responses   
 The empirical framework for my first phase of research builds on Haider-Markel’s work 
(2007; 2010) that examined the how increased queer descriptive representation affected the 
amount of both pro- and anti-LGBT+ bills introduced by other legislators from 1992 to 2002. 
After producing a count variable of all queer legislators from each session as well as a count 
variable of pro- and anti-LGBT+ bills introduced and passed in each state per year, Haider-
Markel found that greater numbers of openly queer elected officials increased both the number of 
pro-LGBT+ and anti-LGBT+ legislation, with a net difference of overall positive effects for the 
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queer community. Such findings both highlight the potential political gains and unintended 
legislative backlash that traditionally underrepresented groups can find from increased 
descriptive representation in legislative bodies (Haider- Markel, 2007; 2010).  
 This first phase of research adopts a modified approach to Haider-Markel’s empirical 
design by exploring the relationship between women’s descriptive representation and the 
introduction of legislation both beneficial and counterproductive to women’s interests. My 
analysis covers state legislative sessions spanning from 1999 to 2009. This time period should 
provide a robust study of reactions to women’s descriptive representation since the number of 
women elected to state legislatures underwent significant fluctuations following the 2000 
elections (Caizza 2004). However, due to both time constraints and data availability, the scope of 
my research is much narrower than Haider-Markel’s original study, which analyzed bills 
originating from both the upper and lower chambers of all fifty state legislatures.1 
 During the early stages of my research design, I found that the most effective way to 
collect data on women’s issue legislation was to manually search state legislative databases, a 
task that was both lengthy and tedious. Initial data acquisition revealed that obtaining data on 
women’s issue legislation for only one legislative session in one legislative chamber of one state 
took an average of 1.5 hours to complete. In order to construct a sample of women’s issue 
legislation from the 1999-2009 sessions in both chambers of all state legislatures, I would have 
had to repeat this process several hundred times over. I had neither the time nor the resources to 
collect a data sample of this large scale. Therefore, I chose to adopt a case study approach for my 
                                                 
1 Ideally, to empirically test whether an increase in women’s descriptive representation results in a legislative 
backlash, I would draw from a sample of women’s issue legislation that encapsulates all legislative sessions from 
1999-2009 from both chambers of all 50 state legislatures. However, in order to select from such a sample, I would 
first have to compile the data myself because a complete dataset does not currently exist. At present time, compiling 
such a dataset would be a difficult task. Since state governments function independently of each other, records of 
women’s issue legislation is inconsistent across states. Furthermore, many state legislative databases are poorly 
designed, hindering efficient data acquisition as well as quicker, automated methods of data collection such as web 
scraping. 
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research design. After considering the data collection that would be required, I determined I had 
sufficient time and resources to study the House chambers of six state legislatures as case studies 
in order to effectively isolate and identify a potential legislative backlash against women. 
 Case Selection. In my case selection, I chose to focus on bills originating from lower 
state chambers, or state Houses. Although the upper chambers, or state Senates, of legislatures 
are a crucial component of states’ legislative frameworks, their fewer number of seats provide 
fewer opportunities for descriptive female representation and their broader constituencies tend to 
result in more moderate policy proposals. In comparison, greater numbers of seats in state 
Houses provide greater opportunities for women’s descriptive representation and structural 
differences that make state Houses more reflective of the general population allow legislators 
more to propose a wider, more responsive range of policies. As a result, focusing primarily on 
state Houses allowed me to search for a more reactive, salient offensive backlash effect in 
response to women’s increased descriptive representation that may have been lost in the culture 
of state Senates.  
When identifying which state Houses to analyze, my case selection was primarily 
influenced by the initial proportion of women present in each state legislature’s lower chamber 
during 1999 and how these proportions changed over the subsequent ten years. While the 
literature suggests that an increase in women’s descriptive representation will lead to an increase 
in both pro- and anti-women’s legislation, it also implies that a state body’s specific proportion 
of female legislators can significantly influence whether female representatives experience 
legislative progress or backlash (Haider-Markel, 2007). Traditional scholarship on “critical mass 
theory” suggests that once female descriptive representation reaches a 15 percent “critical mass” 
threshold, it leads to a marked increase in female substantive representation (Bratton, 2002; 
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Kathlene, 1994). However, backlash theorists have also found that as female representation 
surpasses the 15 percent threshold, it leads to a decline in active representation by female 
legislators (Haider-Markel, 2007). Scholars have interpreted this decline in impact as evidence of 
a potential backlash to the larger presence of women in traditionally male-dominated legislatures 
(Bratton, 2002; Sanbonmatsu, 2008; Yoder, 1994). 
 After compiling data about the number of women in state legislatures from the Center for 
American Women and Politics (CAWP), I calculated the proportion of female legislators in state 
Houses during 1999 sessions as well as the proportion of female legislators in state Houses 
during 2009.2 Once I completed my calculations, I then chose to divide state legislatures into 
three categories based on their relationship to the 15 percent critical mass threshold: (a) states 
above critical mass  (those that had a proportion of female representation greater than 15 percent 
in 1999 and maintained a proportion greater than 15 percent into 2009), (b) states crossing 
critical mass (those that had a proportion less than 15 percent in 1999, but obtained a proportion 
greater than 15 percent by 2009), and (c) states below critical mass (those that had a proportion 
less than 15 percent in 1999 and still remained below 15 percent in 2009). I then selected two 
states that fell into each category. Wisconsin and Washington were selected to represent states 
above critical mass, Indiana and South Dakota were selected to represent states crossing critical 
mass, and Pennsylvania and Alabama were selected to represent states below critical mass (see 
                                                 
2 Using these proportions, I initially found the net proportional growth of women’s representation within the lower 
chambers of state legislatures from 1999 to 2009 by using the formula, . 
Although these calculations helped provide a contextual understanding of representative shifts within each state 
legislature, I ultimately concluded that the net proportional growth of female representation did not have as great an 
influence in the case selection process as each state legislature’s level of critical mass. To select cases based on 
changes in net proportion would likely obscure the actual magnitude of women’s representation in state legislatures. 
For example, although Washington experienced a 1.62% loss from 1999 to 2009, women still comprised 29.59% of 
Washington’s state House in 2009, which is among the highest proportions of women’s representation in the United 
States. 
 
19 
 
Table 1). Despite limitations in the case selection process, these selected state Houses provide 
both regional and political variation, thus allowing for a robust research sample.  
State House Relationship to 
15% Threshold 
Proportion of 
Women (1999) 
Proportion of 
Women (2009) 
Net Change 
Wisconsin Above Threshold 20% 22% +10% 
Washington Above Threshold  37.76% 29.59% -21.62% 
Indiana Crossing Threshold  14% 20% +42.86% 
South Dakota Crossing Threshold 12.86% 20% +55.56% 
Pennsylvania  Below Threshold 12.32% 
 
13.30% 
 
+8% 
 
Alabama  Below Threshold 7.62%  12.38% +62.5% 
 
Table 1. Selected state Houses for case studies.  
 
Dependent Variable. For the first phase of my research exploring whether increased 
female representation leads to an offensive legislative backlash, I measure my dependent 
variable of legislative action related to women’s issues by producing a count variable of the 
annual number of pro- and anti-women bills introduced and passed in each state House during 
the 1999 to 2009 legislative sessions. All data regarding relevant bills were obtained from each 
state legislature’s digital archives through a central database portal provided by National 
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), and coded as either “pro-women” or “anti-women” 
based on its substantive content. Within the literature, the practice of defining particular 
legislation as “pro-women” or “anti-women” remains a controversial topic for two reasons. 
First, such classifications carry the potential to perpetuate stereotypes surrounding 
women’s gender roles. In many cases, issues such as those related to children, education, 
healthcare, social welfare, or the environment are oftentimes assumed to be “women’s issues” 
because of the “soft” or compassionate connotations associated with these policy areas 
(Cammisa & Reingold, 2000; Wolbrecht, 2000). Second, it is impossible to classify legislation 
related to issues such as access to abortions or funding to Planned Parenthood as either pro- or 
anti-women without invoking significant partisan implications. Currently, there is a clear 
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ideological divide between Democrats and Republicans surrounding issues related to women’s 
reproduction. While Democrats tend to classify policies that support abortion and Planned 
Parenthood as policies that are “pro-women,” Republicans tend to classify the exact same 
policies as “anti-women” (Wolbrecht, 2000). 
However, despite these caveats, there is a general consensus throughout the literature that 
pro-women policies can be best defined as those that “expand women’s roles and opportunities, 
either through legal equality or some form of acknowledgement of women’s special needs” 
(Wolbrecht, 2000). Furthermore, there are several resources that can provide guidelines for 
classifying policies as pro- or anti-women according to universal standards. For my analysis, I 
model my classifications based on the Institute for Women’s Policy Research’s (IWPR) 
“Women’s Rights and Resources Checklist of State Policies.” This checklist can be used to 
measure a state’s commitment to policies intended to help women achieve economic, political, 
and social well-being. IWPR developed this checklist based on standards unanimously adopted 
by the 189 countries that attended the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995—
including the United States— with endorsed policies including those that advance protection 
from violence, access to income support through welfare and child support collection, 
employment protections, and reproductive rights (Caiazza, 2004). By following these standards, 
I thus coded my dependent variable in a way that is as unbiased and non-partisan as possible. 
Details regarding this coding schema can be found in Appendix A.  
Independent and Control Variables.  To measure my independent variable of women’s 
descriptive representation, I calculated the proportion of female legislators serving in each state 
from 1999 to 2009 based on the same CAWP data that I used during my case selection. This 
variable captures the potential for female legislators to sponsor legislation that could be 
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classified as pro-women or to oppose legislation that could be classified as anti-women. 
Although the proportion of female legislators is the key variable in my measure of descriptive 
representation, prior research also suggests that a number of institutional legislative 
characteristics will likely influence how each state’s House reacts to the presence of female 
representatives and require inclusion as control variables.   
For this phase of my research, I chose to control for two key factors. First, I controlled for 
where the proportion of female legislators in each House session was in relation to the 15 percent 
critical mass threshold. As previously stated in earlier discussion, scholarship suggests that if the 
proportion of female representation surpasses 15 percent of a legislative body, it could 
potentially trigger an offensive legislative backlash. Therefore, when constructing regression 
models for first phase of my study, I also split my sample based on whether a session fell above 
or below the 15 percent threshold. Here, I expected that the relationship between female 
descriptive backlash and offensive backlash effects would be more pronounced above this 15 
percent threshold than below the threshold. However, neither of these models produced 
statistically or substantively significant results, so they have been excluded from subsequent data 
analysis in this paper.  
Second, I controlled for which political party was in control of the state government 
during each given House session, since a legislative body’s partisan composition can also 
influence legislative reactions to female representation (Bratton & Haynie, 1999; Bishin et. al, 
2015; Haider-Markel, 2010). Currently, there is a significant gender gap between women’s 
support for the Democratic and Republican parties, as the two political parties have developed 
two distinctly different approaches to women’s issues (Caiazza, 2004; Haider-Markel, 2010; 
Wolbrecht 2000). Since the early 1970s, studies on legislators have found a significant 
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correlation between Democratic Party membership and support for women’s rights. Democrats 
have been more likely than Republicans to focus on women’s interests and support policies 
considered beneficial to women on issues such as the Equal Rights Amendment, abortion, 
comparable worth, child care, and antidiscrimination (Caiazza, 2004; Haider-Markel, 2010; 
Wolbrecht 2000).  
Furthermore, research indicates that while an increase in gender diversity is associated 
with a lower number of legislative measures contrary to women’s interests among Democrats, it 
is associated with a higher number of legislative measures contrary to women’s interests among 
Republicans (Bratton, 2002). Such findings indicate a clear partisan difference in reactions 
towards increased female descriptive representation and suggest that a legislative backlash will 
be more likely to occur among Republican than Democratic lines. To measure the influence of 
partisanship within each state legislature, I created three dummy variables that indicated whether 
a given House session occurred when the state government was dominated by Democrats, 
Republicans, or split between the two parties based on records maintained by the NCSL. 
Phase Two: Defensive Backlash Responses 
Although the first phase of my study analyzes more blatant manifestations of legislative 
backlash to women’s increased descriptive representation, this measure alone fails to capture the 
complexity of opposition responses to women’s progress. Currently, there is a great diversity of 
“pro-women’s” legislation such as bills related to insurance coverage of mammograms, equal 
pay, or maternity leave on record in state legislative databases. In contrast, the only type of 
legislation within state records that can be classified as “anti-women” relate to restricting 
women’s reproductive rights. While such bills are coded as “anti-women” under this study’s 
classification, they provide a far narrower scope of what constitutes a legislative backlash when 
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compared to Haider-Markel’s classification of “anti-LGBTQ+” legislation, which included bills 
that would ban same-sex marriage, prevent LGBTQ+ organizations in public schools, ban same 
sex couples from being foster parents, and prevent positive discussions of homosexuality in sex 
education courses (Haider Markel, 2007; 2010). 
Furthermore, while legislative backlash towards queer legislators appears to take on an 
“offensive” approach, with opponents actively proposing bills harmful to the queer community 
(Haider-Markel, 2007; 2010), the legislative backlash towards female legislators seems to take 
on a “defensive” approach, with opponents obstructing women’s rights by blocking bills or 
defunding programs beneficial to women (Ghelen, 1977; Volden et. al, 2010; Wittmer & 
Bouché, 2013). Although empirical studies have suggested that female legislators are just as 
effective as their male counterparts in passing the bills they introduce and blocking the bills they 
oppose (Bratton & Haynie, 1999; Herrick, 2010), the literature has also revealed a curious 
pattern surrounding the passage of bills relating to women’s issues. For, research also implies 
that disproportionate female sponsorship on pro-women’s issues may be detrimental to the 
content of pro-women’s legislation or funding (Wittmer & Bouché, 2013). 
These findings suggest that women’s sponsorship on women’s issue bills may serve as an 
additional proxy measurement for women’s descriptive representation within state legislatures. 
Within the literature, bill sponsorship is recognized as action that not only signals a legislator’s 
policy priorities, but demonstrates a legislator’s leadership and political power (Wittmer & 
Bouché, 2013). While disproportionate male or equitable male-female sponsorship of women’s 
issue bills may be viewed benevolently, disproportionate female sponsorship on a women’s issue 
bill may serve as a subconscious reminder to male legislators about an increasing female 
presence and participation in historically male-dominated state legislatures. Such reminders 
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about this interruption of the status quo may result in male legislators failing to support female-
sponsored pro-women’s legislation by letting bills die in committee, attaching problematic riders 
or amendments, or even voting against the legislation when it comes to the floor. As a result, the 
second phase of this study attempts to empirically capture manifestations of a more subtle 
“defensive” legislative backlash towards women by measuring the legislative success rate of pro-
women bills based on the ratio of female to male sponsorship.  
Dependent Variable. In order to examine a potential defensive backlash response to 
women’s increased descriptive representation, I coded my dependent variable as an ordinal 
dependent variable that measured how far a women’s issue bill advanced in a given state House 
session on a scale of 0 to 7.  On this scale, a 0 indicates that a bill received “no action or died in 
committee,” 1 indicates a bill received “action in a state House committee,” 2 indicates a bill 
received “action on the state House floor,” 3 indicates a bill “passed the state House,” 4 indicates 
a bill received “action in a state Senate committee,” 5 indicates a bill received “action on the 
state Senate floor,” 6 indicates a bill “passed the state Senate,” and 7 indicates a bill “became 
law.” Unlike other forms of analysis that only consider a bill’s success rate in terms of its 
introduction and passage, this type of analysis reveals relevant differences in how successfully 
pro-women’s bills are passed throughout the key immediate stages of the legislative process 
based on gender dynamics (Volden et. al 2010).  
 Independent and Control Variables. In the second phase of my study, I expand upon the 
first phase’s independent variable of women’s descriptive representation by focusing more 
closely on bills identified by the first phase’s classification as “pro-women,” and investigating 
how the gender composition of each bill’s sponsorship impacts its legislative trajectory. In order 
to measure women’s descriptive representation as it relates to a defensive backlash, I calculated 
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the proportion of female sponsorship on each pro-women bill based on legislator rosters 
available on state databases. This proportion of female sponsorship functions as my main 
independent variable of interest.  
 For this phase of my research, I chose to control for two other characteristics related to a 
pro-women bill’s sponsorship and content that may affect its ultimate success of passage. First, I 
controlled for the proportion of Democratic sponsorship on each pro-women bill. Given previous 
discussion regarding positive associations between the Democratic Party and women’s issues, 
one may infer that Democrats will be more likely than Republicans to sponsor a pro-women bill. 
However, while higher proportions of Democratic sponsorship may be beneficial to a pro-
women bill’s progress in Democratic-controlled sessions, such high Democratic sponsorship is 
likely to result in greater opposition towards a pro-women bill in a Republican-controlled 
session. Just as I found the proportion of female sponsorship on each pro-women bill using R-
programming, I used the same coding to calculate the proportion of Democratic sponsorship 
based on state legislative rosters from state databases.  
 Second, I controlled for the legislative content found in each pro-women bill itself. Given 
the different levels associated with different types of pro-women’s bills, I thought it important to 
acknowledge the reality that legislators may react less favorably towards a pro-women bill 
related to reproductive rights than to a pro-women bill related to domestic violence and safety. 
Therefore, I coded seven dummy variables regarding different policy areas that a pro-women bill 
could address based on the same IWPR standards that informed my coding of pro- versus anti-
women bills in Phase One of my research. These categories include “employment and earnings,” 
“poverty and opportunity,” “health and well-being,” “reproductive rights,” “violence and safety,” 
“work and family,” and “political participation.”  
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Examples of pro-women bills related to “employment and earnings” included bills that 
sought to address the gender wage gap, while bills related to “poverty and opportunity” included 
bills that increased Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) funding. Similarly, examples of pro-
women bills related to “health and well-being” included bills that sought to require health 
insurance coverage for breast cancer, bills related to “reproductive rights” included bills that 
sought to expand access to abortion services,  and bills related to “violence and safety” included 
increased penalties against domestic abusers. Finally, examples of pro-women bills related to 
“work and family” included bills that sought to require employers to provide mothers with paid 
maternity leave, and “political participation” included bills that sought to form a state-sponsored 
Commission for Women. More examples of pro-women bills in each policy area can be found in 
Appendix A. 
Data  
Offensive Backlash Results 
When exploring potential offensive legislative backlash effects in the first phase of my 
research, I used multivariate least squares regression, which allows for easy interpretation of the 
impact of women’s descriptive representation on the number of pro- and anti-women bills 
introduced per session. Following data acquisition, I was able to produce a dataset of 
observations for 51 legislative sessions, which functioned as my unit of analysis. Using this 
dataset, I first analyzed the average legislative characteristics that could be found within the 
Alabama, Indiana, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin state Houses. 
Summary Statististics of Legislative Sessions (1999-2009) 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation  
Pro-women bills (count) 12.000 10.032           
Anti-women bills (count)  2.059     1.475           
Neutral bills (count)  0.765     1.380 
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Proportion female legislators   0.174     .0717 
Democratic control  0.333     0.476 
Republican control  0.373     0.488           
Split control 0.294     0.460          
 
Table 2. Summary statistics of 1999-2009 legislative sessions (n=51).  
 
From 1999 to 2009, approximately 12 pro-women bills, 2 anti-women bills, and 1 neutral 
bill was introduced during the average legislative session.3 During this ten-year period, female 
representatives comprised on average 17 percent of House chambers, 2 percentage points above 
the recognized 15 percent critical mass threshold. Furthermore, 33 percent of sessions were 
controlled by Democrats, 37 percent were controlled by Republicans, and 29 percent were split 
in terms of partisan control.  
In order to test my hypotheses that an increase in women’s descriptive representation in 
state legislatures would lead to (a) an increase in legislation beneficial and (b) an increase in 
legislation counterproductive to women’s interests, I ran three main regression models. For my 
first model, I used the number of pro-women bills introduced per session as my dependent 
variable to test whether an increase in women’s descriptive representation would lead to an 
increase in pro-women bills. In my second model, I used the number of anti-women bills 
introduced per session as my dependent variable to test whether an increase in women’s 
descriptive representation would lead to an increase in anti-women bills. Finally, for my third 
model, I used the number of neutral women bills introduced per session as my dependent 
variable to test whether an increase in women’s descriptive representation would have any effect 
on the number of neutral women bills as a supplement to my hypotheses. Table 3 shows the 
results of these regression models below.  
 
                                                 
3 Here, a “neutral bill” is defined as a bill related to women but considered neither explicitly pro- nor anti-women, 
i.e. bills requiring hospitals to provide women with information about cord blood banking.  
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OLS Predictions About Types Bills Introduced Per Session  
Variable Pro-Women Bills Anti-Women Bills Neutral Women Bills 
Proportion female legislators   -1.175 (20.593) 4.967 (2.907)* -8.964 (2.392)** 
Republican control  0.366 (3.452) -0.369 (0.487) -0.791 (0.401)* 
Split control -0.613 (3.694) -0.669 (0.521) -0.551 (0.429) 
Constant  12.254 (4.238)** 1.529 (0.598)* 2.782 (5.65)** 
N of observations  51 51 51 
R2 0.002 0.081 0.288 
Adjusted R2 -0.062 0.022 0.243 
 
Table 3. OLS Predictions about effect of increased female descriptive representation on types of women’s 
bills introduced per session.  
NOTE: Values represent OLS parameter estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Democratic control 
omitted due to collinearity.  
*p< 0.10, two-tailed; ** p < 0.05, two-tailed. 
 
 
 As Table 3 demonstrates, the relationship between the proportion of female 
representatives and the number of pro-women bills produced in a given session failed to be 
statistically significant. As a result, these results suggest that an increase in female descriptive 
representation does not lead to an increase in substantive representation. Such findings fail to 
support the first of my hypotheses surrounding an offensive backlash effect and are surprising 
because they depart from a robust literature that has consistently suggested there is a direct 
correlation between descriptive and substantive representation.  
 However, the results produced in my second regression model, which used the number of 
anti-women bills introduced per session as its dependent variable, appear to support the second 
of my hypotheses surrounding an offensive backlash effect. As one can observe in Table 3, the 
relationship between the proportion of female representatives and the number of anti-women 
bills introduced per legislative session is statistically significant at a .10-level. Therefore, it is 
likely there exists relationship between the proportion of female representatives in a state House 
and the number of anti-women bills introduced in a given session. 
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Figure 1. Aggregate correlation between proportion of female representatives in state Houses and number of 
women’s bills considered counterproductive to women’s progress. Each dot represents the average number of 
bills considered counterproductive to women’s progress, with the proportion of female representation plotted 
at 0.05 increments. Averages were calculated based on model output to provide a simplified visual 
representation of the correlation.  
 
As Figure 1 indicates, this relationship is direct, with the number of anti-women bills increasing 
as the proportion of female representation increases within state Houses. Such findings support 
the second of my hypotheses regarding an offensive backlash effect, and suggests the existence 
of a slight offensive legislative backlash in response to women’s growing representation in state 
Houses. 
 Curiously, my third regression model that used the number of neutral women’s bills 
introduced per session as its dependent variable also produced statistically significant findings. 
As demonstrated by Table 2, the relationship between the proportion of female representatives 
and the number of neutral women bills introduced per legislative session is statistically 
significant at a .05-level.  
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Figure 2. Aggregate correlation between proportion of female representatives in state Houses and number of 
women’s bills considered neither productive nor counterproductive to women’s progress. Each dot represents 
the average number of bills considered neither productive nor counterproductive to women’s progress, with 
the proportion of female representation plotted at 0.05 increments. Averages were calculated based on model 
output to provide a simplified visual representation of the correlation 
 
One can observe in Figure 2 that this relationship is inverse, with the number neutral women 
bills introduced per session decreasing as the proportion of female representation in state Houses 
increases. However, it is difficult to determine the dynamics that result in this trend. It is also 
worth noting that within this model, the data appear to suggest that a statistically significant 
inverse relationship exists between whether a state House is Republican-controlled and the 
number of neutral women bills introduced per session.   
Defensive Backlash Results 
 When exploring potential defensive backlash effects in the second phase of my research, 
I chose to use ordered logistic regression since my dependent variable is an ordered variable that 
provides a rank order of how far a women’s issue bill has advanced in the legislative process. 
This regression technique thus allowed me to predict the probabilities of how far each women’s 
issue bill would progress based on other variables. During this second phase, individual pro-
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women bills served as the unit of analysis, with my dataset providing observations for 756 pro-
women bills. 
Summary Statististics of Pro-Women Bills 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Final bill status  2.147 2.725 
Proportion female sponsorship   0.310   0.286 
Proportion Democratic sponsorship 0.630 0.337 
Proportion female legislators   0.172 0.080 
Democratic control  0.353 0.478 
Republican control  0.374    0.484 
Split control 0.272 0.446 
 
Table 4. Summary statistics of pro-women bills from 1999-2009 legislative sessions (n=756). NOTE: n=747 for 
“Percentage Democratic sponsorship.  
 
From Table 4, one can observe that when considering the dependent variable of how far a 
given pro-women bill will progress, the mean for a given pro-women’s issue bill is 2.14 or 
approximately 2 on the legislative trajectory scale of 0 to 7 (with 0 indicating a bill received “no 
action or died in committee” and 7 indicating a bill was “signed into law”). This mean suggests 
that the average women’s issue bill only advances far enough to receive “action on the House 
floor.” However, this variable also has a relatively large standard deviation of 2.75, suggesting a 
considerable amount of variability surrounding how far a given pro-women bill may advance.  
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Figure 3. Distribution of pro-women bill’s legislative trajectory. 
 
Furthermore, Figure 3 demonstrates the overall distribution of how far pro-women’s issue bills 
advance on average throughout the legislative process. As one can observe, although the 
majority of bills only reach a 0  in terms of advancement ( “dying in committee”), large numbers 
of bills also advance to a 1 (“receiving action in a House committee”) and a 7-level (“becoming a 
law.”) 
 In addition, my main independent variable of female sponsorship has a mean of only 
approximately 0.31, which indicates that only 31 percent of the average women’s issue bill’s 
sponsorship comes from female legislators. Although this number may seem small, given that on 
average female legislators hold only 25.2 percent of state Houses across America (Center for 
American Women in Politics, 2016), this proportion is relatively large when viewed as a metric 
for women’s descriptive representation and may therefore trigger a defensive legislative backlash 
effect. 
  Types of Pro-Women Bills 
Category Proportion  Standard Deviation  
Addresses employment and earning  0.050 0.219 
Addresses poverty and opportunity  0.030 0.172 
Addresses health and well-being  0.184 0.388 
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Addresses reproductive rights 0.206 0.405 
Addresses violence and safety  0.384 0.487 
Addresses work and family 0.123 0.329 
Addresses political participation  0.022 0.148 
 
Table 5. Summary statistics of types of pro-women bills from 1999-2009 legislative sessions (n=756). 
 
 Furthermore, when examining the types of categories that women’s issue legislation tends to fall 
under in Table 5, one can observe that pro-women bills most frequently relate to issues 
concerning violence against women and safety (38 percent), reproductive rights (21 percent), and 
women’s healthcare (18 percent).  
Additionally, because the mean proportion of Democratic sponsorship on pro-women 
bills is 0.63, one may infer that the average women’s issue bill is disproportionately sponsored 
by Democrats.  
Democratic Affiliation by Gender 
 N of Observations  Mean  Standard Deviation 
Female  924 0.541 0.499 
Male  4,459 0.469 0.499 
 
Table 6. Democratic affiliation based on legislators’ gender.  
 
When looking more closely at the Democratic affiliation of legislators overall, it is interesting to 
note that on average, 54 percent of female legislators from the 1999 to 2009 legislative sessions 
identified themselves as Democrats, while only 47 percent of male legislators identified 
themselves as Democrats. Such results therefore appear to support contemporary claims of a 
gender gap in terms of political ideology between women and men.  
My defensive backlash hypotheses predicted that pro-women bills more heavily 
sponsored by women would be less likely to: (a) receive action in state House committees or on 
state House floors, (b) pass state Houses, (c) receive action in State Senate committees or on 
state Senate floors, (d) pass state Senates, or (e) become signed into law by a given state’s 
governor. 
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Ordered Logistic Predictions About Pro-Women Bill 
Advancement   
Variable Final Bill Status  
Proportion female sponsorship   0.127 (0.257)  
Proportion Democratic sponsorship   -0.673 (0.220)** 
Proportion female legislators  4.067 (0.896)** 
Democratic control 0.667 (0.180)** 
Republican control 0.052 (0.185) 
Addresses employment and earning  0.405 (0.563) 
Addresses poverty and opportunity  0.314 (0.620) 
Addresses health and well-being  -0.093 (0.498) 
Addresses reproductive rights -0.649 (0.497) 
Addresses violence and safety  0.398 (0.479)  
Addresses work and family -0.132 (0.512) 
N of observations  747 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.0348 
 
Table 7. Ordered logistic predictions about effect of increased female sponsorship on pro-women bill 
advancement.  
NOTE: Values represent OLogit parameter estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Split control and 
bills related to political participation omitted due to collinearity.  
*p< 0.10, two-tailed; ** p < 0.05, two-tailed. 
 
Based on the results produced by my regression model, one can observe that three of my 
independent variables are statistically significant at p<0.05. The first of these variables is the 
proportion of Democratic sponsors and co-sponsors on a given pro-women’s bill. For this 
variable p <0.05,  meaning that there is likely a statistical relationship between the proportion of 
Democratic representatives sponsoring a pro-women’s issue bill and how far a bill advances in 
the legislative process, holding all other variables constant. This variable’s negative coefficient 
further suggests that, controlling for other independent variables, as the proportion of Democratic 
sponsorship on a pro-women’s issue bill increases, the probability that the bill will advance 
farther in the legislative process decreases. Such findings are interesting, as one may wonder 
what qualities related to greater Democratic sponsorship could impede a given pro-women bill’s 
progress.  
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However, one potential explanation may be inferred based on the characteristics of 
another statistically significant independent variable: Democratic control. Statistically significant 
with p <0.05, it is likely there is a statistical relationship between whether a state House is 
controlled by Democrats and how far a pro-women’s bill will advance in the legislative process, 
holding all other variables constant. This variable’s positive coefficient suggests that, 
controlling for all other independent variables, if a pro-women’s bill is introduced during a 
Democratic-controlled session, the probability that the bill will advance further in the legislative 
process increases. This correlation suggests that although increased Democratic sponsorship may 
decrease the likelihood of how far a pro-women’s bill will advance, this trend is more specific in 
Republican-controlled sessions than Democratic-controlled sessions.  
Finally, the other independent variable that is statically significant in this model is the 
proportion of female legislators in the state House during a given session. Of the three 
independent variables found to be statistically significant, this variable is most relevant to my 
defensive backlash theses. In this model, the proportion of female sponsors and cosponsors on a 
given pro-women’s bill fails to be statistically significant, thus failing to support my overarching 
defensive backlash hypothesis that pro-women bills more heavily sponsored by women will be 
less likely to advance in the legislative process.  
However, the fact that the proportion of female legislators in a session is statistically 
significant presents an interesting insight into the broader dynamics surrounding women’s bills 
throughout legislative process. With p<0.05, it is likely there is a statistical relationship between 
the proportion of female representatives in a state House and how far a bill advances in the 
legislative process. The variable’s positive coefficient further indicates that as this proportion of 
female representatives in a given state House increases, the probability that the bill will advance 
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farther in the legislative process increases, holding all other variables constant. Such a 
relationship suggests that although the results produced from the offensive backlash phase of my 
thesis failed to support the existence of a direct relationship between the proportion of female 
representatives and the number of pro-women bills introduced, increased female representation 
in a state House may be beneficial in helping to farther advance the pro-women bills that are 
introduced during the legislative process than would have been otherwise possible.  
Yet, while this model found that the proportion of Democratic sponsorship, Democratic 
control of the legislature, and the proportion of female representatives are statistically significant, 
I was uncertain whether this statistical significance equated to substantive significance. 
Therefore, in order to more closely examine the influence of these independent variables on the 
average probability of how far a pro-women’s bill will advance, I ran Stata’s mchange 
function, which measures each independent variable’s marginal effect on the dependent variable, 
in order to better examine the impact of these variables. To gain a comprehensive understanding 
of each independent variable’s influence on the probability of how far a pro-women’s issue bill 
will advance, I first examined the baseline probabilities of the average pro-women bill’s 
legislative trajectory.  
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Figure 4. Probability of how far a bill considered productive to women’s progress will advance in the 
legislative process within a 95% CI. 
 
As one may observe in Figure 4, holding all values constant, there is an average 0.45 
probability that a pro-women bill will receive “no action or die in committee,” a 0.20 probability 
a bill will receive “action in a House committee,” a 0.03 probability a bill will receive “action on 
the House floor,” a 0.08 probability a bill will “pass the House,” a 0.03 probability a bill will 
“receive action in a Senate committee,” a 0.03 probability a bill will “receive action on the 
Senate floor,” a 0.004 probability a bill will “pass the Senate,” and a 0.19 probability a bill will 
“become law.” Based on these probabilities, one can infer that the majority of pro-women bills 
will not progress beyond the original House committees to which they are assigned.  
When analyzing the marginal effect of the multiple independent variables on a pro-
women bill’s legislative trajectory, I chose to focus on the three independent variables that were 
found to be statistically significant earlier in the process: the proportion of Democratic 
sponsorship of on pro-women bills, Democratic control of a House session, and the proportion of 
female representation in a House session. 
  
Marginal Effect of Independent Variables on Probability of Final Bill Status  
Variable Final Bill Status 
(+1 Unit Change) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Proportion Democratic 
sponsorship 
0.224** -0.045** -0.010** -0.034** -0.012** -0.013** -0.002 -0.018** 
Democratic control -0.202** 0.005 0.006** 0.027** 0.011** 0.013** 0.002 0.138** 
Proportion female 
legislators  
-0.441** -0.187** -0.026** -0.075** -0.022** -0.022** -0.004 0.777** 
 
Table 8.  Marginal effect of Democratic sponsorship, Democratic control, and female representation on 
probability of pro-women bill issue advancement (n=606.)  
*p< 0.10, two-tailed; ** p < 0.05, two-tailed. 
 
Looking at the marginal effect of Democratic sponsorship on pro-women bills in Table 8, 
one can see that holding all other variables constant at their observed values, if one increases the 
proportion of Democratic sponsorship on a pro-women bill by one unit, it increases the chance 
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that the bill will receive “no action or die in committee” while decreasing the chance that it will 
progress farther in all other categories of the legislative process. This trend appears to be 
statistically significant at p<0.05 across all phases of the legislative process except for a pro-
women bill’s probability of “passing the Senate.”  
Initially, the marginal effect of Democratic sponsorship on the trajectory of pro-women 
bills may appear to mostly be substantively insignificant. On average, a unit increase in 
Democratic sponsorship only leads to a 0.045 decrease in the probability of a bill “receiving 
action in a House committee,” a 0.010 decrease in the probability of a bill “receiving action on 
the House floor,” a 0.034 decrease in the probability of a bill “passing the House,” a 0.012 
decrease in the probability of a bill “receiving action in a Senate committee,” a 0.002 decrease in 
the probability of a bill “ receiving action on the Senate floor,” and a 0.108 decrease in the 
probability of a bill “becoming law.” However, a unit increase in Democratic sponsorship on a 
pro-women bill is also associated with a 0.224 increase in the probability that a bill will “receive 
action or die in committee and a 0.108 decrease in the probability that a bill will “become law.” 
Such findings therefore suggest that although Democratic sponsorship may not carry a 
substantive impact during the transitory phases of the legislative process, during the initial phase 
of the legislative process, Democratic sponsorship can have a significant influence in increasing 
the chances of a pro-women bill dying in committee and hinder its ultimate passage.  
When examining the influence of Democratic control on the probability of how far a pro-
women bill will advance in the legislative process, one can observe that holding all other 
variables constant at their observed values, if a pro-women bill is introduced in a Democratic-
controlled House, it decreases the probability that a bill will “receive no action or die in 
committee,” while increasing the chances it will advance farther in all other categories of the 
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legislative process. This trend appears to be statistically significant at p<0.05 across the majority 
of these categories, although it fails to demonstrate a statistically significant relationship in 
influencing whether a pro-women bill will “receive action in a House committee,” or “pass the 
Senate.” Initially, the marginal effect of Democratic House control on the trajectory of pro-
women bills may appear to mostly be substantively insignificant, much like the marginal effect 
of Democratic sponsorship on the trajectory of women’s issue bills. On average, a Democratic-
controlled House only increases the probability that a bill will “receive action in a House 
committee” by 0.005, the probability a bill will “receive action on the House floor” by 0.006, the 
probability a bill will “pass the House” by 0.027, the probability a bill will “receive action in a 
Senate committee” by 0.011, and the probability a bill will “receive action on the Senate floor” 
by 0.013.  
Yet, much like earlier trends observed when examining the marginal effect of Democratic 
sponsorship, the regression also reveals that if a pro-women bill is introduced during a 
Democratic-controlled session the probability that a bill will “receive no action or die in 
committee” decreases by 0.202 and the probability that a bill will “become law” increases by 
0.138. Therefore, while whether or not a pro-women bill is introduced during a Democratic-
controlled session may not have a large impact on other stages of the legislative process, 
Democratic control may improve the probability of a bill ultimately becoming law.  
Finally, when analyzing the marginal effect of female representation within a House 
session on how far a pro-women bill will advance throughout the legislative process, one can see 
that holding all other variables constant, if one increases the proportion of female representation 
in a state House by one unit, the proportion of female representation in the House has the greatest 
influence on decreasing the probability that a bill will “receive no action or die in committee” 
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and increasing the probability that a bill will “become law, “holding all other variables constant. 
This trend is statistically significant a p<0.05 across almost all categories of the legislative 
process, except for the probability of a bill “passing the House.”  
As with analysis of Democratic sponsorship and Democratic control, the marginal effect 
of female representation in a state House is far too minute during the transitory phases of the 
legislative process to be considered substantively significant. However, more substantive results 
can instead be found when examining the marginal effect of female representation in the initial 
and final phases of the legislative process. Holding all other variables constant, a unit increase in 
the proportion of female representation decreases the probability that a bill will “receive no 
action or die in committee” by 0.441 and increases the probability that bill will “become law” by 
a 0.777. The large marginal effect of female representation on these two phases of the legislative 
process, especially the final phase of a bill “becoming law,” suggests substantial implications 
about the impact that an increased female presence in state legislatures may have when 
successfully advancing pro-women bills. One may see such effects visualized below in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5. The marginal effect of increased female representation on the probability of a pro-women 
bill advancing farther in legislative process  
 
Analyzing Partisan Dynamics  
 
Given the apparent impact that partisanship has on a pro-women bill’s trajectory, based 
on the statistical significance of Democratic sponsorship and Democratic control, I then chose to 
further examine whether increased women’s representation would differently affect the progress 
of pro-women’s bills in Democratic-controlled sessions compared to Republican-controlled 
sessions. To achieve this purposes, I stratified my earlier ordered logistic model based on 
partisan control.  
Ordered Logistic Predictions About Pro-Women Bill Advancement Based on Partisan 
Control   
Variable Final Bill Status 
(Democratic Control)  
Final Bill Status 
(Republican Control) 
Proportion female sponsorship   -0.772 (0.404)* 1.684 (0.620)** 
Proportion Democratic sponsorship   0.078 (0.457) -2.474 (0.554)** 
Proportion female legislators  3.239 (1.474)** 30.901 (4.962) ** 
Addresses employment and earning  -2.007 (1.100)* -0.452 (1.584)  
Addresses poverty and opportunity  -0.400 (1.011) 2.702 (1.543)* 
Addresses health and well-being  -0.110 (0.822) 0.233 (1.136) 
Addresses reproductive rights 0.049 (0.946) -0.943 (1.284) 
Addresses violence and safety  0.652 (0.785) 0.932 (1.111) 
Addresses work and family 0.268 (0.867) 0.491 (1.150) 
N of observations  204 231 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.051 0.200 
 
Table 9. Ordered logistic predictions about effect of increased female sponsorship on pro-women bill 
advancement based on partisan control.  
NOTE: Values represent OLogit parameter estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Split control and 
bills related to political participation omitted due to collinearity.  
*p< 0.10, two-tailed; ** p < 0.05, two-tailed. 
 
Comparing the results based on these two partisan models in Table 9, one can discern 
some interesting similarities. Under both Democratic and Republican-controlled legislative 
sessions, there is a statistically significant direct correlation between the proportion of women in 
the state legislature and how far a pro-women bill will progress, holding all other variables 
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constant. Under both forms of party control, this relationship is significant at p<0.05. Yet, aside 
from this trend, other statistically significant characteristics found under the two types of party 
control appear to diverge. Holding all other variables constant, there is a statistically significant 
relationship in Republican-controlled sessions that as Democratic sponsorship on a pro-women 
bill increases, the likelihood of a bill becoming law decreases. Such a trend does not exist in 
Democratic-controlled legislatures.  
However, given the naturally adversarial nature of the Democratic and Republican parties 
within America’s two-party system, such findings seem fairly intuitive. When a given party is in 
control, majority party leaders such as the Speaker of the House have the ability to set the 
legislative agenda and regulate the flow of legislation. Thus, during a Republican-controlled 
session, House leadership would most likely seek to discourage the advancement of Democratic 
initiatives as early as possible in the legislative process. Furthermore, Republican legislators who 
constitute the majority of the chamber would have the ability to block a heavily Democratically-
sponsored bill, should it advance further in the legislative process. Yet, during a Democratic-
controlled session, such a conflict would not exist, thus allowing a bill with higher Democratic 
sponsorship to more easily progress without opposition.  
Perhaps the most surprising findings of these partisan models are the results surrounding 
how the proportion of female sponsors on a pro-women bill affects a bill’s legislative trajectory. 
Within the context of this study, the proportion of female sponsorship on pro-women bills 
serves as the primary independent variable in determining whether a form of defensive backlash 
exists, wherein as female sponsorship on pro-women’s legislation increases, legislators will be 
more likely to block the bill’s passage. When the defensive backlash is put in a partisan context, 
one may initially infer that given voting trends indicating the Democratic Party tends to have 
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policies considered more attractive to female constituents and that, within this dataset, female 
legislators are more likely to be Democratic, forms of defensive backlash would be less salient or 
non-existent within Democratic-controlled sessions. Yet, the results of my research suggest just 
the opposite.  
Looking at Table 9, one can observe that within Democratic-controlled legislators the 
proportion of female sponsorship is statistically significant at p<0.10. Thus, there is a slight 
likelihood that there is a statistical relationship between the number of female representatives 
sponsoring a pro-women bill and how far a bill advances in the legislative process, holding all 
other variables constant. This variable’s negative coefficient additionally suggests that, 
controlling for other variables, as the proportion of female sponsorship on a pro-women bill 
increases, the probability that the bill will advance farther in the legislative process decreases. 
Such findings support my hypothesis that an increase in female descriptive representation results 
in a defensive legislative backlash. However, the data suggest that the presence of a defensive 
legislative backlash in Republican-controlled sessions is not only absent, but that as the 
proportion of female sponsorship on pro-women bills increases, the probability that the bill will 
progress further in the legislative process increases, holding all other variables constant. This 
relationship is statistically significant at p<0.05.   
Marginal Effect of Independent Variables on Probability of Final Bill Status (Democratic Control) 
Variable Final Bill Status 
(+1 Unit Change) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Proportion female 
sponsorship 
0.151 * 0.013 -0.002 -0.012 -0.013 -0.020* N/A -0.116** 
Proportion Democratic 
sponsorship  
-0.013 -0.004 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 N/A 0.014 
Proportion female 
legislators  
-0.251** -0.222** -0.011 -0.047** -0.033* -0.035 N/A 0.599** 
 
Table 10. Marginal effect of female sponsorship, Democratic sponsorship, and female representation on 
probability of pro-women bill issue advancement (n=204.)  
NOTE: Model unable to calculate marginal effect of independent variables on probability a bill will “pass the 
Senate” due to limited number of data.  
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*p< 0.10, two-tailed; ** p < 0.05, two-tailed. 
 
Marginal Effect of Independent Variables on Probability of Final Bill Status (Republican Control) 
Variable Final Bill Status 
(+1 Unit Change) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Proportion female 
sponsorship 
-0.295** 0.028** 0.017** 0.058** 0.012 0.008 N/A 0.172** 
Proportion Democratic 
sponsorship  
0.286** -0.085** -0.023** -0.057** -0.010* -0.006 N/A -0.106** 
Proportion female 
legislators  
-0.582** -0.139** -0.035** -0.085** -0.014* -0.009 N/A 0.865 
 
Table 11. Marginal effect of female sponsorship, Democratic sponsorship, and female representation on 
probability of pro-women bill issue advancement (n=231.)  
NOTE: Model unable to calculate marginal effect of independent variables on probability a bill will “pass the 
Senate” due to limited number of data.  
*p< 0.10, two-tailed; ** p < 0.05, two-tailed. 
 
Furthermore, as Table 10 indicates, under Democratic-controlled sessions, the marginal 
effect of female sponsorship on pro-women bills is only statistically significant at p<0.10 for 
three stages of the legislative process. These stages include the average probability of a pro-
women bill for “receiving no action or dying in the committee,” receiving action on the Senate 
floor,” and “becoming law.” The substantive significance of this influence varies. Holding all 
other variables constant, a unit increase in the female sponsorship on a pro-women bill during a 
Democratic-controlled session is associated with a 0.151 probability increase that a bill will 
“receive no action or die in committee,” a 0.020 probability decrease a bill will “receive action 
on the Senate floor,” and a 0.116 probability decrease in a bill “becoming law.” Thus, the 
defensive backlash implied to exist within Democratic sessions appears most prevalent when 
bills are initially introduced, where bills are blocked before they have a chance to begin the 
legislative process.  
 In comparison, under Republican-controlled sessions, the influence of female 
sponsorship on a pro-women bill’s legislative trajectory meets a more stringent level of statistical 
significance, at p<0.05. In addition, the marginal effect of female sponsorship is statistically 
significant across most categories of the legislative process, if one exempts increasing the 
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chances that a bill will “receive action in a Senate committee,” or “receive action on the Senate 
floor.” Overall, holding all other variables constant, a unit increase in the proportion of female 
sponsorship of pro-women bills in a Republican session decreases the chance that a bill will 
“receive no action or die in committee,” while increasing the chances that a bill will “receive 
action on the House floor,” “pass the House,” and “become law.” Much like in Democratic-
controlled sessions, the substantive significance of female sponsorship’s marginal effect appears 
most prevalent in decreasing the probability that a bill will “receive no action or die in 
committee” by 0.295 and increasing the probability that a bill will “become law” by 0.172.  
 One may visually compare and contrast different partisan responses to increased female 
sponsorship in Figure 6 and Figure 7.   
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Figure 6. The marginal effect of increased female sponsorship during a Democratic-controlled session on the 
probability of a pro-women bill advancing farther in legislative process. 
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Figure 7. The marginal effect of increased female sponsorship during a Republican-controlled session on the 
probability of a pro-women bill advancing farther in legislative process.  
 
Still, one may argue that although the marginal effect of female sponsorship on the 
trajectory of pro-women bills along partisan lines provides an interesting insight, it fails to offer 
an explanation for the seemingly counterintuitive nature of the defensive backlash being present 
during Democratic-controlled sessions, but opposite in its effect during Republican-controlled 
sessions. Absent of further analysis, one may initially posit that because of these trends, 
Republican legislators may simply be more receptive to greater proportions of female 
sponsorship on pro-women bills than Democratic legislators. However, by comparing the 
baseline probabilities of a pro-women bill’s legislative trajectory in Table 12, one may also 
interpret an alternate explanation for these partisan dynamics.  
Baseline Probability of Final Bill Status Based on Partisan Control 
Variable Final Bill Status 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Democratic control  0.272 0.267 0.014 0.066 0.051 0.066 N/A 0.263 
Republican control   0.582 0.139 0.035 0.085 0.014 0.009 N/A 0.135 
 
Table 12. Baseline probability of pro-women bill advancement in Democratic and Republican-controlled 
sessions. 
NOTE: Model unable to calculate marginal effect of independent variables on probability a bill will “pass the 
Senate” due to limited number of data.  
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Overall, the baseline probabilities demonstrated in Table 12 indicate that holding all other 
variables constant, a pro-women bill is far more likely to be struck down earlier during the 
legislative process in a Republican-controlled session than in a Democratic session. While there 
is a 0.582 probability a pro-women bill will “receive no action or die in committee” during a 
Republican-controlled session, there is only a 0.272 probability that a pro-women bill will meet a 
similar fate during a Democratic-controlled session. Furthermore, it appears that holding all other 
variables constant, a pro-women bill is far less likely to “become law” in a Republican-
controlled session than a Democratic-controlled session. The probability of a bill “becoming 
law” under Republican-control is only 0.135, whereas the probability of bill “becoming law” 
under Democratic control is nearly twice that probability, at 0.263. From these baseline 
probabilities, one may then infer that there are other factors affecting the presence of the 
defensive backlash only in Democratic sessions, since it appears that Democrats are more 
inclined to pass pro-women legislation than Republicans. It thus seems unlikely that increased 
female sponsorship would change this apparent support amongst legislators unless other factors 
are at play.  
Discussion 
It is important to note that although in the Democratic and Republican-controlled models, 
one could measure the marginal effect of female sponsorship, these models did not explicitly 
indicate which legislators were reacting positively or negatively in response to increased female 
sponsorship. Therefore, recalling the literature surrounding backlash theory and the concept of 
power dynamics related to the “status quo,” it is plausible that in Democratic-controlled sessions 
where a pro-women bill is introduced with a higher proportion of female sponsorship, it is not 
Democratic legislators who attempt to hinder the bill’s legislative progress, but Republicans. 
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Likewise, it is plausible that in Republican-controlled sessions where a pro-women bill is 
introduced with a higher proportion of female sponsorship, it is not Republican legislators who 
attempt to bolster the bill’s legislative progress, but Democrats.  
Perhaps pro-women bills with high female sponsorship in Democratic-controlled sessions 
has a greater negative salience for Republicans in the minority, who could feel their power 
threatened not only ideologically along partisan lines, but gender lines as well—thus compelling 
Republican legislators to mobilize in opposition to the proposed pro-women legislation. 
Contrariwise, perhaps pro-women bills with high female sponsorship in Republican-controlled 
sessions have a positive salience for Democrats in the minority, who feel compelled to rally 
alongside their female colleagues, thus leading to increased mobilization. In this circumstance, 
Republicans may not feel as threatened and compelled to counter-mobilize against attempts to 
promote pro-women legislation in the earlier stages of the legislative process, since as the party 
in control they are in a position of power that allows them to block the legislation later in the 
process and prevent shifts to the status quo.  
Conclusion  
I began my research seeking to fill gaps in the existing literature surrounding potential 
backlash effects that could occur in response to women’s increased representation in state 
legislatures. I theorized that a potential backlash towards women’s increased descriptive 
representation would occur in two forms: an offensive backlash (wherein opponents would 
actively propose bills considered counterproductive to women’s progress) and a defensive 
backlash (wherein opponents would adopt a more subtle form of resistance by obstructing pro-
women bills throughout the legislative process.) Based on these predictions, I divided my 
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research into two phases, in which “Phase One” would focus on potential offensive backlash 
effects and “Phase Two” would focus on potential defensive backlash effects.  
For Phase One of my research, I hypothesized that an increase in the proportion of female 
legislators would result in: (a) an increase in pro-women’s legislation and (b) an increase in anti-
women’s legislation. Overall, the results of my linear regression analysis indicate that as female 
representation increases, the number of pro-women bills introduced does not increase at a 
statistically significant level, thus failing to support the first of my offensive backlash 
hypotheses. Such findings are surprising as they fail to support previous research that suggests 
there is a positive relationship between women’s increased descriptive and substantive 
representation. However, my results also indicate that as female representation increases, the 
number of anti-women bills introduced increases as well at a statistically significant level of 
p<0.10. Such a relationship suggests that there is a slight offensive legislative backlash effect in 
response to women’s increased descriptive representation.  
For Phase Two of my research, I hypothesized that as the proportion of female 
sponsorship on pro-women’s bills increases, such bills would be less likely to: (a) receive action 
in state House committees or on state House floors, (b) pass state Houses, (c) receive action in 
State Senate committees or on state Senate floors, (d) pass state Senates, or (e) be signed into law 
by a given state’s governor. The results of my ordered logistic analysis indicate that increased 
female sponsorship on pro-women bills decreases the probability a bill will advance farther in 
the legislative process during Democratic-controlled sessions, but increases the probability 
during Republican-controlled sessions. This relationship suggests that a defensive backlash in 
response to women’s increased descriptive representation depends upon partisan dynamics, but 
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does exist under certain circumstances in a way that supports my overarching defensive backlash 
hypotheses.  
Therefore, my research contributes to the literature by offering empirical evidence that 
increased female representation results in a slight offensive backlash, as well as a partisan form 
of a defensive backlash specific to legislative sessions where the Democratic Party has a 
majority. Such findings will hopefully facilitate a better understanding of how male legislators 
respond to the increased presence of female legislators within state governments in a way that 
allows women to consider effective ways to attain or preserve political gains without 
unintentionally triggering backlash responses. I also hope that my research will lead researchers 
to examine whether other traditionally marginalized groups that have previously encountered 
offensive backlash responses—such as the Black, Latino, and LBGTQ+ communities—may also 
experience some form of a defensive backlash in response to increased descriptive 
representation.  
 In the future, I would like to expand the scope of my dataset in order to produce more 
robust results, particularly within the offensive backlash phase of my research. Preferably, in 
upcoming studies, I will be able to incorporate datasets from additional state Houses throughout 
the United States as well as extend the time frame of my research into the 2016 state legislative 
sessions. In terms of my research models, I would also like to further explore the partisan 
dynamic that appeared during the defensive backlash phase of my research. Although I briefly 
explored the idea that a defensive backlash effect towards increased descriptive representation 
primarily occurs based on the partisan minority’s perception of the status quo, it would be useful 
to empirically test this theory.  
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Additionally, I would be interested in examining whether the particular positions that 
women occupy within a given state legislature have any effect upon legislative backlash 
responses. For example, it would be useful to explore whether increasing numbers of female 
legislators who hold key positions of authority such as Speaker of the House or committee chairs 
are more of a help or a hindrance towards women’s political gains. One could easily conceive 
that having descriptive representation in areas that allow women to more easily set the agenda 
may combat potential backlash effects. However, the ascension of women to such powerful 
positions may also trigger even more severe legislative backlash, with male legislators 
perceiving this form of increased female leadership as an even greater threat to the status quo.  
 This potential negative impact associated with women’s attainment of higher level 
political positions leads me to examine the final area where I would like to expand my research. 
Given recent discussion surrounding how Secretary Hillary Clinton’s defeat during the 2016 
presidential election was in many ways a backlash response to Clinton’s female identity (Bush, 
2016), I would be interested in adapting my research model to analyze legislative backlash 
effects on a federal level. I would be especially curious to examine whether forms of backlash 
towards women’s increased descriptive representation vary from the state to federal level, and if 
so, how such differences may occur.  
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Appendix A: Standards for Coding Bills 
 The schema that I used for coding bills as pro- or anti-women based on standards set by 
the Institute for Women’s Policy Research (IWPR) is provided below. Bills are categorized 
based on the primary policy area that they fall under.  
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TYPES OF WOMEN’S LEGISLATION 
 
LEGISLATIVE  
CODING 
 
EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS   
Establishment/ expansion of:  
Paid family leave: ...............................................................................................................................PRO 
Paid maternity leave:.........................................................................................................................PRO 
Adjustments to achieve pay equity/bridge gender wage gap:........................................................................PRO 
 
POVERTY AND OPPORTUNITY 
Increased funding for:  
 Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) services....................................................................................PRO 
 Commissions on Minority and Women’s Businesses.........................................................................PRO 
Increased penalties for: 
Child support violations: ...................................................................................................................PRO 
 
HEALTH AND WELL-BEING  
Increased/required medical insurance coverage/funding for:  
 Breast cancer......................................................................................................................................PRO 
 Breast reproduction surgery..............................................................................................................PRO 
 Cervical cancer...................................................................................................................................PRO
 Osteoporosis......................................................................................................................................PRO 
 Mammograms....................................................................................................................................PRO 
 Pap smears.........................................................................................................................................PRO 
 Prenatal care......................................................................................................................................PRO 
               Midwifery...........................................................................................................................................PRO 
Postpartum depression......................................................................................................................PRO 
Women’s health (general)..................................................................................................................PRO 
 
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 
Changes to abortion services that:                        
Ban partial-birth abortions................................................................................................................ANTI 
Establish a waiting period..................................................................................................................ANTI 
Allow only a physician to perform procedures..................................................................................ANTI 
Require mandatory parental consent or notification........................................................................ANTI   
Require facilities to match standards of ambulatory surgical centers..............................................ANTI 
Require mandatory ultrasounds........................................................................................................ANTI                     
Increased/required medical insurance coverage/funding for:  
 Contraceptives..................................................................................................................................PRO 
 Reproductive health services............................................................................................................PRO 
Infertility treatments:........................................................................................................................PRO 
Decreased/exempt medical insurance coverage/funding for:  
 Contraceptives..................................................................................................................................ANTI 
 Reproductive health services............................................................................................................ANTI 
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Infertility treatments:........................................................................................................................ANTI 
 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN  
Appropriations for: 
Battered women’s shelters:...............................................................................................................PRO 
Coalition against domestic violence...................................................................................................PRO 
Compliance with: 
Family Violence Protection Order Enforcement Act..........................................................................PRO 
Protection from Abuse Act................................................................................................................PRO 
Increased penalties for:  
Domestic violence..............................................................................................................................PRO 
Rape....................................................................................................................................................PRO 
Sexual assault.....................................................................................................................................PRO 
Human trafficking...............................................................................................................................PRO 
Sexual harassment.............................................................................................................................PRO 
Stalking...............................................................................................................................................PRO  
 
WORK & FAMILY   
Mothers allowed to breastfeed in any public or private location....................................................................PRO 
Employers required/given tax incentives to provide subsidized childcare......................................................PRO 
 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION  
Establishment of any commission/committee/office for women’s specific interests: ...................................PRO 
 
 
